Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks by Klausen, Jytte et al.
Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks
Jytte Klausen
Brandeis University
415 South Street
Waltham, MA 02453
klausen@brandeis.edu
Christopher E Marks
Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
555 Technology Square
Cambridge, MA 02139
cemarks@mit.edu
Tauhid Zaman
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02139
zlisto@mit.edu
Online extremists in social networks pose a new form of threat to the general public. These extremists
range from cyberbullies who harass innocent users to terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) that use social networks to recruit and incite violence. Currently social networks suspend
the accounts of such extremists in response to user complaints. The challenge is that these extremist users
simply create new accounts and continue their activities. In this work we present a new set of operational
capabilities to deal with the threat posed by online extremists in social networks.
Using data from several hundred thousand extremist accounts on Twitter, we develop a behavioral model
for these users, in particular what their accounts look like and who they connect with. This model is used to
identify new extremist accounts by predicting if they will be suspended for extremist activity. We also use
this model to track existing extremist users as they create new accounts by identifying if two accounts belong
to the same user. Finally, we present a model for searching the social network to efficiently find suspended
users’ new accounts based on a variant of the classic Polya’s urn setup. We find a simple characterization of
the optimal search policy for this model under fairly general conditions. Our urn model and main theoretical
results generalize easily to search problems in other fields.
Key words : social media, social networks, online extremism, Polya’s urn, network search
1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a huge increase in the number and size of online extremist groups
using social networks to harass users, recruit new members, and incite violence. These groups
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include terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [4], white national-
ists and Nazi sympathizers [28], and cyberbullies who target individuals with offensive and harass-
ing messages [8]. Of particular concern is the danger posed to public safety by terrorist groups.
The threat from terrorist groups such as ISIS has become so severe that U.S. president Barack
Obama recently said “The United States will continue to do our part, by working with partners to
counter ISIL’s1 hateful propaganda, especially online” [15]. It is suspected that the online presence
of ISIS may have been responsible for radicalizing individuals and motivating them to commit acts
of terror [7].
Social network have recently begun taking actions to actively combat online extremists. For
instance, Twitter, which has become the main venue for ISIS users to spread their propaganda
[15], has been very aggressive in its response to ISIS. In August 2016, Twitter reported that it had
shut down over 360,000 ISIS accounts and its daily suspensions of terrorism-linked accounts have
jumped 80 percent since 2015 [1]. Twitter identifies extremist accounts primarily based on reports
from its users, but it has begun using proprietary spam-fighting tools to supplement these reports.
These tools have helped to automatically identify more than one third of the accounts that were
ultimately suspended for promoting terrorism on Twitter [29].
The efforts of social networks such as Twitter have been effective at limiting the reach of online
extremist groups such as ISIS. However, not all extremist users are shut down and they are con-
stantly returning to the social network after being suspended. In addition, much of the success in
mitigating the threats of extremist groups has relied upon the cooperation of the social networks
themselves. For instance, Twitter has dedicated teams to review user reports of potential extremist
accounts [1]. However, if extremist users migrate to other social networks, there is no guarantee that
the companies which operate these networks will be as cooperative or dedicate as many resources
to dealing with online extremists. Therefore, what is needed is a set of capabilities that can be used
by authorities to combat online extremists which do not rely upon the cooperation of the social
network operators and can be applied to any social network.
1.1. Our Contributions
The case of ISIS in Twitter is useful to understand general behavioral patterns of online extremist
users in social networks. We use these behaviors to guide the development of capabilities for
combating online extremists in general social networks. We provide a detailed analysis of these
behaviors and develop the corresponding capabilities in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6. Here we will provide
a concise overview of our major contributions, in particular the different behavioral patterns of
online extremists and the corresponding capabilities we develop.
1 ISIL is another name for ISIS and stands for is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
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Suspensions. Online extremist users post content which violate the Terms of Use of social
networks, leading to the suspension of their accounts. These suspensions occur in response to user
reports, but many social networks are beginning to use algorithms to automatically detect any
violative content. Going one step further, it would be useful to have a capability to flag users as
potential extremists before they post any content at all. There are potential features of an account
that may predict if it belongs to an extremist user. For instance, the account may not publicly
declare its geographical location. Also, the users to which the account connects may indicate
whether or not the account belongs to an extremist user. In Section 3 we use these intuitions to
develop a method to automatically predict if an account will be suspended without requiring it to
post any content.
Creating Multiple Accounts. After being suspended, online extremist users will quickly
create new accounts and continue their activities on the social network. This makes it difficult to
keep an extremist user off the social network. Typically the new account resembles the suspended
account in several aspects. For instance, the names and profile pictures may be very similar. A
useful capability would be the ability to identify if multiple accounts as belong to the same user.
This would allow for more accurate monitoring and tracking of extremist users. We develop such
a capability in Section 4.
Refollowing Previous Friends. A user in a social network generally follows a set of users. In
Twitter these followed users are referred to as the friends of the user and the user is referred to as
their follower. Upon returning to the social network after being suspended, an extremist user will
generally refollow some of his previous friends. If we knew which previous friends a suspended user
refollows, this information could be used to find the user’s new account in the social network. There
may be features of the friends which make it more likely the suspended user will refollow them. In
Section 5 we use these features to develop a method to predict who suspended users refollow.
Suspended User Search. Authorities may wish to find suspended users when they return to
a social network. The operator of the social network is notified every time a new user enters the
network and can use our account matching capability to see if the new user matches a previously
suspended user. However, if one is not the operator of the social network, then one must search the
network to see if the suspended user has returned. Because of the size of the social network, this
search could require a large amount of time and resources. To overcome this challenge, we develop
an efficient network search policy in Section 6 based on a variant of a Polya’s urn model which
utilizes our refollowing prediction capability from Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review the extant literature relevant
to our work in Section 1.2. We provide a detailed overview of the data used for our analysis
in Section 2. Section 3 presents our predicting suspensions capability. We present our account
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matching capability in Section 4. Our method for predicting refollowing is presented in Section
5. Section 6 details our model for network search and an optimal search policy. We conclude in
Section 7.
1.2. Previous Work
Analysis of Online Extremist Networks There are several studies focused on ISIS users in
social networks. One of the first studies characterizes the number, behavioral traits, and organiza-
tion of Twitter ISIS users [4]. A subsequent study by the same authors found that the reach of ISIS
had been limited by the beginning of 2016 due to the efforts of Twitter to suspend ISIS accounts
[5]. In [16] the authors study the dynamics of ISIS users in the Russian social network VKontakte
and suggest that shutting down smaller pro-ISIS groups can prevent the emergence of larger, more
influential groups. In [14] the authors develop models to predict which users will be suspended for
being in ISIS, who will retweet ISIS content, and who will interact with ISIS users. This work is
similar to our work, but the authors do not study many of the capabilities we develops such as
identifying multiple accounts from a single user, refollowing old friends, or searching for suspended
users.
There have also been several works looking at identifying extremist content in groups beyond
ISIS. In [24] the authors develop methods to automatically classify content that is used for recruiting
members to extremist groups. Similar work in [27] used machine learning to detect content that
promotes hate and extremism. Machine learning methods have also been used to detect cyberbullies
based on the content they post [23, 12]. The work in [13] builds upon this work to develop an
approach for mitigating the threat of cyberbullying.
Spam/Bot Detection Closely related to our capabilities on predicting suspensions is the work
done on detecting online bots (non-human users) or malicious users. Several approaches have
been developed which use different types of behavioral features. The type of content (URL’s, user
mentions) was found to be predictive of Twitter bots in [20]. Temporal behavior and aggregate
network properties (in-degree,out-degree) were used to identify Twitter bots in [9]. In [11] the
authors demonstrate that the sentiment of the posted content can be used to identify bots. All of
these approaches are designed to detect automated behavior. However, they may not be as effective
for human users who engage in extremist behavior. Also, many of these approaches require the user
to post some content in order to detect whether or not they are bots. An approach related to ours is
in [19] which relies purely on network structure to identify malicious users in social networks where
edges have a polarity (friend/enemy). In contrast to this extant work, our approach combines both
behavioral features with refined network features to detect extremist users.
Klausen, Marks, and Zaman: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks
5
Network Search Our network search problem is similar to those presented by Alpern and
Lidbetter [3] and Dagan and Gal [10], who have done much work in this area. Unlike their work, in
which the searcher and the target are assumed to be operating in a physical network, our problem
of searching a social network admits a different set of search constraints. In our network search
problem, the searcher is not constrained to move along edges. Instead, the searcher can examine
the neighbors of any of a set of nodes that are known to him, but each of these queries comes at
a cost. This alternative representation of network search follows from one of the original search
problems posed by Black [6], in which a searcher looks for the search target among a set of possible
locations. Each location has a known probability of containing the target and a known probability
of finding the target, if it is there. Our network search application adapts this simple search model
to a network setting. Instead of limiting the search target to be at at most one of a set of possible
locations, in a network search the target could be connected to more than one of the nodes known
to the searcher. Also, the method of querying the neighbors of a node causes the probability of
finding the target to change with each observation.
Our network search model builds directly on the multi-urn search model presented in [21].
However, in this work the major difference is that we allow for more than one query to be done in
each step, which results in slight differences in the optimal policies.
2. Data
The data we study in this work comes form the micro-blogging site Twitter [31]. Twitter serves as
a front line public platform used by ISIS for outreach and recruitment. ISIS’s presence on Twitter,
and its consistent success at gaining support and recruits through the social media site has been
deeply analyzed and well-documented [4].
Twitter users form a social network by connecting to each other. This network is directed and
this directionality dictates the flow of information. A user forms a connection with someone on
Twitter by following him or her. Each account a user is following is known as this user’s friend and
the user is known as the friend’s follower. These friends/followers edges form the Twitter social
network. This network is then used to transmit information. In Twitter, this information comes in
the form of short messages that users post known as tweets. When a user posts a tweet, that tweet
appears in the Twitter timeline of all the user’s followers. In this manner, information flows from
users to their followers in Twitter.
For this research, we collected Twitter data from approximately 5,000 “seed” users, who were
either known ISIS members or who were connected to many known ISIS members as friends or
followers. The names of these seed users were obtained through news stories, blogs, and reports
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released by law enforcement agencies and think tanks [18]. The data was collected at various times
throughout the calendar year 2015, using Twitter’s REST API (see [30]).
For each seed user we collected the user account profile information, including the screen name,
name, description, location, profile picture, and profile banner at the time of the collection. We also
obtained the user account ID number, which is the only unchangeable unique account identifier. In
addition to obtaining seed users’ profile information, we collected the same set of profile information
for each seed user’s friends and followers. As a result the number of user profiles contained in the
data set grew to over 1.3 million.
We downloaded all publicly available tweets from each seed user’s timeline at the time of collec-
tion. For each tweet we obtained the unique tweet ID assigned by Twitter, the tweet text, the time
of the post, all hashtags, user mentions, URLs, and images contained in the tweet, and whether
the tweet was a retweet of or reply to another tweet. The total number of tweets in our data is
approximately 4.8 million.
Finally, we tracked many of the accounts for several months in 2015 in order to see if they were
ever suspended. We do not know the reason for suspension, but given that these accounts were
associated with known ISIS users, we assume the suspension was related to some form of extremist
propaganda that violated Twitter’s user agreement. We tracked all of the user accounts collected
in June, 2015, including the seed accounts and their friends’ and followers’ accounts. This data set
includes 646,961 accounts in total, of which 35,080 (or 5.4%) had been suspended as of September
23, 2015.
3. Predicting Account Suspensions
The first capability we develop to combat online extremism is to predict which accounts belong to
new extremist users. In this section we develop an approach to this using logistic regression. We
label any account in our data set as extremist if it was suspended by Twitter. Therefore, to detect
extremists we predict which accounts are suspended by Twitter. We accomplish this using a logistic
regression model based upon features of the user accounts. We provide out-of-sample performance
evaluation of the model and provide insights on what factors might be useful in predicting whether
a Twitter user is going to be suspended for violative behavior.
To train, validate, and test this prediction model we use a subset of the accounts whose sus-
pension status we tracked. We randomly selected two non-overlapping samples of this data sets,
each consisting of 5,000 accounts and maintaining the 5.4% suspension rate, which is the overall
suspension rate of these accounts. These data sets were used for training and validation.
For our logistic regression model, the response variable is whether the account was still active as
of September 23, 2015. The predictors are obtained from the wide array of information associated
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Feature type Feature
Network Following each of 2,376 active ISIS seed accounts in our data
(2,376 binary variables).
Account Date and time the account was created (numeric).
Account Number of “friends” and “followers” connected to the account
(2 numeric variables).
Account Number of tweets from the account (numeric).
Account Geo-location enabled (binary).
Account “Protected” account (posts are not visible to the public) (binary).
Account Verified account (identity confirmed by Twitter) (binary).
Table 1 Features for predicting Twitter suspensions.
with the user accounts. Some of these relate to the account itself, while others have to do with the
network connections of the account. The variables used as predictors for our model are listed in
Table 1. While we have observed that the number of screen name changes associated with a user
account might serve as a good predictor of future suspension, we assume that this information is
not necessarily known for an arbitrary account we wish to classify. Similarly, we assume we do not
know if the account was following accounts that were suspended in the past. All features we use
are what could be measured for a new account that has not been seen before.
3.1. Results
We fit a logistic regression model with L1-norm regularization to the training data. From vali-
dation, we find that setting the regularization constant to 10 consistently provided near-optimal
performance. The resulting coefficient estimates were nonzero for 89 of the predictor variables, of
which 81 corresponded to following certain accounts. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients
give us some idea of the effects of some of the predictor variables. The coefficient estimates indicate
that accounts that had enabled geo-tagging and accounts that had Twitter-verified owners were
much less likely to be suspended. This is not surprising given that we expect online extremists to
want to mask their identity and location. The effects of friendships were less intuitive and difficult
to interpret. In total we found that 38 accounts had a positive sign and 43 had a negative sign.
However, there was no clear pattern that we could find among the positive sign accounts or nega-
tive sign accounts. More detailed analysis may reveal what made following these accounts increase
or decrease the likelihood of suspension. Nonetheless, just knowing the value of the regression
coefficient was sufficient to predict suspensions.
Figure 1 shows the receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curve on the validation set and on
the test data, which was comprised of the 636,961 accounts not used for training and validation.
The area under the curve (AUC) on the test data is approximately 0.83. We can see from the
curve that we can detect about 60% of suspended users in the test set with only a 10% “false
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AUC: 0.83
Figure 1 ROC curve for the regularized logistic regression classifier for Twitter suspensions.
Table 2 Summary of sampled accounts from those incorrectly classified as suspensions using the regularized
logistic regression model.
Screen Name Summary
@abdulnagi313 Few tweets, difficult to discern nature of account.
@445468a7e3fc45c Very few tweets, user apparently follows ISIS activity and members
on Twitter; possibly conducting research or surveillance.
@613780 Tweets Quranic verses in Arabic every few hours in consistent for-
mat; likely a Twitter bot.
@aarishmajeed Account with no tweets following three ISIS-related media
accounts.
@men9174 Arabic-language pornography account followed by one of our seed
accounts; following many other pornographic accounts.
positive” rate. This efficiency occurs by setting a classification probability of 0.1, i.e., classifying
an account as an ISIS account if the regression function assigns a probability of suspension higher
than this threshold. It is important to note that because 94.6% of the accounts in our data were
not suspended, a 10% false positive rate represents a greater number of false positive classifications
than true detections using this logistic regression model. However, it is also important to consider
that accounts that have not been suspended could still be suspended in the future, or that some
accounts in our data should be suspended but have succeeded in avoiding detection.
Sampling from the false positives resulting from this classification returned some accounts that
were clearly ISIS supporters, supporting this notion that many accounts should be or soon would
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be suspended. Many of these “false positives,” however, were ISIS researchers, media, or otherwise
difficult to discern. Table 2 provides a summary of five randomly selected false positives found in
our test data, when applying the classification probability threshold of 0.1. The inclusion of the
pornographic account @men9174 as a false positive is interesting and concerning. Investigation
reveals that this account is not following any of our ISIS seed accounts. Our model classified this
account with a probability of 0.101, very near our threshold, based primarily on its profile features.
4. Detecting Multiple Accounts
Now that we have a model for predicting suspensions, the next question we address is whether
we can automatically determine whether two accounts belong to the same user. This question is
relevant because we have observed many cases in which a user simply creates a new account after
being suspended. We have even found ISIS accounts dedicated to the purpose of broadcasting
suspended users’ new accounts to ISIS members and supporters. By detecting multiple accounts
belonging to the same user, one can prevent extremist users from restarting their violative behaviors
by creating new accounts and effectively keep them suspended from the social network.
Twitter profiles essentially serve as avatars; the syntax and pictures provide cues about the
identity of the account holder. This is true for ISIS users as well and is intrinsic to the tactic
behind the ISIS-based networks directed at recruitment. As a result, when a suspended user opens
a new account in Twitter, we have been able to identify it by comparing the names, images,
screen names, and descriptions associated with each account. This behavior is intuitive: these newly
created accounts include cues to permit the suspended user’s followers to identify and re-follow the
recreated accounts. We have found many examples of this predictable reiteration of account profile
features in our data.
4.1. Suspended User Behavior
In addition to regular account suspensions, we also observed that known ISIS users in our data set
changed their screen names regularly. We hypothesize that frequent screen name changes provide a
means of avoiding tracking and detection, while retaining account information, friends and follower
connections, and Twitter posts. We also note that accounts that exhibit multiple screen name
changes had higher suspension rates, which could mean that users are changing their screen names
to avoid suspension.
Table 3 provides a timeline of screen name and name changes for two such accounts, purportedly
belonging to British citizen Sally Jones who had adopted the online alias “Umm Hussain al-Britani,’
[25]. Sally Jones and her husband, Junaid Hussain achieved celebrity status in ISIS, primarily due
to Junaid Hussain’s role in creating and leading the “CyberCaliphate,” as well as his previous
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involvement in the “Team Poison” hacking group. Junaid Hussain was killed in a US airstrike in
August 2015 [2]. The timeline in Table 3 was reconstructed from observed tweets, but the tweets
from both of these accounts are no longer available due to account suspensions. We note that the
screen name changes became much more frequent when the user believed her behavior might result
in suspension. We also observe that in almost all cases, the user chooses some variant of the same
online handle, e.g., “OumHu55inBrit,” which helps her retain her online identity and signals her
status by announcing her attachment to Junaid Hussain, who always used the online alias “Abu
Hussain al-Britani” (see follow-on discussion and Table 7).
Table 3 Partial screen name—tweet timelines for two Twitter user accounts purportedly belonging to Sally
Jones. These accounts have been suspended by Twitter and are no longer available.
First Account
Tweet Time Screen Name
2015-09-30 11:45:37 OumHu554inBrit
2015-09-30 19:58:15 OumHu554inBrit
2015-10-02 13:43:59 Mrsl337
2015-10-02 21:28:54 OumHu554inBrit
2015-10-03 00:48:01 UmmHu55ain2
2015-10-03 15:30:08† Oum1337
2015-10-03 16:52:39 OumHu554inBrit
2015-10-03 16:55:45 OumHu554inBrit
2015-10-03 17:24:06 OumHu554inBrit
2015-10-03 23:31:29 UmmHussain9ll
2015-10-04 13:20:47 OumHu554inBrit
Second Account
Tweet Time Screen Name
2015-10-05 16:44:55‡ OumHu554in
2015-10-05 17:44:28 OumHu554in
2015-10-05 20:36:22 OumHu554in
2015-10-06 18:03:26 OumHussain
2015-10-07 13:24:47 OumHussa1n
†In this tweet the user warns she is about to release information that could get her suspended, and
encourages her followers to be ready to retweet her.
‡This is the first tweet in a new user account, as the previous one was suspended.
While there might have been additional screen names and tweets associated with these accounts
that we did not capture, we found the type of online behavior exhibited in Table 3 indicative of many
of the ISIS-supporting accounts in our data set. Following suspension, the user apparently opens
a new account and continues the same tactic, all the while adopting very similar account screen
names and names. Prominent ISIS members Sally Jones and Junaid Hussain provide examples of
this behavior; accounts associated with them appear frequently in our ISIS data. Querying our data
for user accounts with a name similar to “Umm Hussain Al-Britani” returns 23 distinct entries, all
of which have been suspended.
Empirically, we found that we observed screen name changes in approximately 10% of the
accounts in our data that were eventually suspended, while in the accounts that remained active
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Figure 2 Histogram of screen names for active and suspended accounts in our data. The average numbers of
screen names for suspended and active accounts are listed in the legend.
the number was close to 1%. Furthermore, anecdotal investigation of active accounts with multiple
screen name changes suggests that many of these accounts are also ISIS-related. Figure 2 pro-
vides a histogram comparison of the number of screen names associated with active and suspended
accounts in our data set. It is clear from the figure that the suspended accounts are much more
likely to have more screen names. For example, even though active accounts make up over 94% of
our data, only 18% of the accounts with over 20 unique screen names are still active.
These observations motivated our development of a method for locating new accounts belonging
to a specific user. The first step in this process was to develop an automated method of identifying
whether a pair of accounts belong to the same user. To achieve this pairwise classification, we
employ a supervised machine learning approach, which is described next.
4.2. Profile Comparison Metrics
We define a Twitter user profile as a vector of profile features x associated with a Twitter account.
A Twitter account can only have a single user profile at any point in time. The features of the
profile are not fixed, however. As we have noted, cases exist in our data in which users changed
their screen name or other profile features, resulting in our obtaining multiple user profile feature
vectors belonging to the same account.
While it is possible for a single Twitter account to belong to different users at different times
(e.g., an account gets hacked or one user simply provides the account login information to another),
we assume that all of the profiles associated with the same Twitter account belong to a single user.
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Our classification goal is therefore to compare two user profiles (x(i),x(j)) from different Twitter
accounts and identify whether or not they belong to the same user.
In order to train a model to perform this classification, we must construct profile comparison
features from profile pairs (x(i),x(j)) that are useful in establishing whether they belong to the same
user. Building on our qualitative observations of individual ISIS Twitter users retaining identifying
similarities between their multiple user profiles, we propose a set of similarity metrics based on
comparisons of the following four profile features: screen name, user name, profile picture, and
profile banner image. These similarity metrics are based on user profile characteristics that are
publicly available on all accounts, even if the user has “protected” the account using Twitter’s
privacy settings.
4.2.1. Screen name and user name similarity metrics In comparing two screen names or
two user names, we use the well-known Levenshtein ratio (see [26]) to provide a measure of distance
between two strings. This ratio involves counting the number of character additions, deletions, or
place exchanges required to transform one string into the other. This number is normalized by the
length of the longer string and then subtracted from one. If we let S be a set of strings of various
lengths, the Levenshtein ratio can be thought of as a function L : S2→ [0,1] where L(s1, s1) = 1
and L(s1, s2) = L(s2, s1) for any s ∈ S. L(s1, s2) = 0 implies that strings s1 and s2 are not at all
similar.
Our first two comparison features, φ1 and φ2, are simply the screen name and user name Leven-
shtein ratios:
φ1(x
(i),x(j)) =L(x
(i)
SN , x
(j)
SN), φ2(x
(i),x(j)) =L(x
(i)
N , x
(j)
N ),
where x
(i)
SN and x
(i)
N denote the respective screen name and user name of account profile x
(i). Figure
3 provides an illustration of five screen name pairs and their corresponding Levenshtein ratios.
Figure 3 Example screen name comparison Levenshtein ratios.
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4.2.2. Profile picture and profile banner similarity metrics We employ a simple image
average hash algorithm (e.g., [22]) to compare two pictures. Essentially, the algorithm partitions
the image into 8× 8 equal-sized rectangular sub-images and then identifies whether the average
shade of each sub-image is brighter or darker than the overall image average. The algorithm runs
efficiently and returns an 8× 8 binary matrix, which can easily be represented as a non-negative
integer.
We denote the hash algorithm as a function H : Ψ→Z+, where for any ψ1,ψ2 ∈Ψ,
ψ1 =ψ2⇒H(ψ1) = H(ψ2)
H(ψ1) 6= H(ψ2)⇒ψ1 6=ψ2
H(ψ1) = H(ψ2)⇒ψ1 ≈ψ2.
Two images with the same hash value contain very similar patterns of shade. Therefore, we assume
that images with the same value are the same image. Our image similarity metric (h) is a simple
step function that follows from this assumption:
h : Ψ2→{0,1}, h(ψ1,ψ2) =
{
1 H(ψ1) = H(ψ2)
0 H(ψ1) 6= H(ψ2).
We use this image similarity metric to construct our third and fourth features:
φ3(x
(i),x(j)) = h(x
(i)
PP , x
(j)
PP )
φ4(x
(i),x(j)) = h(x
(i)
BP , x
(j)
BP ),
where x
(i)
PP and x
(i)
BP are the respective profile and banner pictures for profile x
(i). These features
are simply binary indicators for whether or not the images being compared have the same average
hash matrix.
4.3. Data Set Construction
Having defined pairwise account profile similarity features, our next step was to clean the data and
extract the features for use in a classification model. Initially we examined 4,339 seed user accounts
collected before June 4, 2015. However, in order to keep the string similarity metrics consistent,
we removed 395 accounts with user names strings that did not use the Latin alphabet. This left
us with 3,944 user profiles. Within this set, we knew some user profiles we collected belonged to
the same Twitter account and therefore the same user. These accounts were identifiable by the
Twitter user ID, which does not change even if a user changes his or her screen name or other
profile features. Our set of 3,944 profiles contained 3,855 unique Twitter accounts (i.e., unique user
IDs), corresponding to 3,855 seed users. For each pair of user profiles (i, j), we computed a feature
vector φ(i,j) of the four similarity metrics. This results in
(
3,944
2
)
= 7,775,596 pairs.
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4.4. Data Labeling
We assume that each pair of user profiles either belong to the same user or belong to different
users. We denote this classification with binary class variable y(i,j), where
y(i,j) =
{
1 Profiles i and j belong to the same user
0 Profiles i and j belong to different users.
Of the 7,775,596 pairwise profile comparisons in our data, 95 could be traced to the same user
because they actually belonged to the same account, identifiable by the Twitter user ID. Although
we do not seek to classify profiles belonging to the same account because we can already assume
they belong to the same user, we left these comparison points in the data set as labeled data in order
to train the classification model. Updating profile features for an existing account is a different
action than creating a new Twitter account, however, causing this labeled set to be biased toward
profiles that are very similar. On the other hand, when a user creates a new Twitter account,
he or she must deliberately set or leave blank each of the profile settings. As a result, we do not
expect the same level of similarity between two user profiles associated with separate accounts, but
belonging to the same user, when compared to the similarity between two profiles belonging to the
same Twitter account.
As a result, using these 95 pre-labeled data points for training might not be very useful for our
purpose. We also do not have any points classified as accounts belonging to different users. To solve
this problem, we labeled a subset of comparisons in our data set using the following method.
1. If profile x(i) and profile x(j) share the same user ID, set label y(i,j) = 1. These are the 95
profile comparisons that are known to belong to the same user.
2. If profile x(i) and profile x(j) do not share the same user ID, and
(x(i),x(j)) :
∥∥φ(i,j)∥∥
2
< 0.1, (1)
we set label y(i,j) = 0. These conditions establish that the profiles have very little in common, so
we assume they belong to different users. Table 4 provides an example of the features associated
with a pair of accounts meeting this criterion.
3. Manually label a randomly selected subset of unlabeled pairs that exhibit relatively high
similarity metrics. We chose 168 pairs from the set of 1,257,350 pairs where
(x(i),x(j)) :
∥∥φ(i,j)∥∥
2
> 0.85, (2)
for manual labeling. In assigning a label to these pairs, we considered all available data in comparing
the two profiles, including Twitter posting habits and account profile features, such as location and
description, that are not considered in the model. We found that 82 of these pairs were accounts
belonging to the same user, while the remaining 86 of them were from different users. Table 5
provides an example comparison of the features of a pair of accounts meeting this criterion.
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Table 4 Accounts exhibiting very low similarity, according to the selection criterion given in equation (1).
Feature (k) User i User j φ
(i,j)
k
User ID 2683126250 3108319204 [NA]
Screen Name khalidbinalwale profomar0 0.08
Name Abu Muslim prof 0.00
Profile Picture 00. . . c3 09. . . cc 0.00
Profile Banner 00. . . 00 [None] 0.00
‖φ(i,j)‖2 = 0.08
Table 5 Accounts exhibiting very high similarity, according to selection criterion given in equation (2). These
accounts were manually labeled as belonging to the same user, i.e., y(i,j) = 1.
Feature (k) User i User j φ
(i,j)
k
User ID 3307258107 3297609231 [NA]
Screen Name Ahmes Zirve Ahmes Zirve 0.88
Name Ahmes Zirve Ahmes Zirve 1.00
Profile Picture ff. . . ff ff. . . ff 1.00
Profile Banner [None] [None] 1.00
‖φ(i,j)‖2 = 1.94
4.5. Classification Model
From our set of labeled data, we set aside 10% for out of sample evaluation of model performance.
This percentage was enforced for each of the three labeling methods, so that the test set included
10% of the hand labeled data points, for example. We then fit an L1-regularized logistic regression
model on the training data. In other words, we assume
P(y(i,j) = 1) =
(
1 + eβ
T φ(i,j)+β0
)−1
We identified λ = 10 as the regularization parameter that provided the best performance in
cross validation. The intercept and coefficients for the logistic regression model fit on the training
data are shown in Table 6. Interestingly, profile banner similarity is not useful in this model in
determining the probability of two profiles belonging to the same user.
Table 6 Regression coefficients for matching accounts.
Feature Regression coefficient
Intercept -8.05
Screen name Levenshtein ratio (φ1) 2.94
User name Levenshtein ratio (φ2) 7.05
Profile picture hash matrix (φ3) 1.88
Banner picture hash matrix (φ4) 0
The receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curve plotted for the manually labeled training and
test data combined is given in Figure 4. ROC curves plotted separately for the training and test
data were very similar, and classification on the test data points that were not manually labeled
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Figure 4 Logistic regression ROC curve on hand labeled data.
(i.e., they were labeled using steps (1) or (2) of the labeling method given in section 4.4) was nearly
perfect. The AUC in Figure 4 is approximately 0.91.
We view the ROC curve on the manually labeled data in Figure 4 as an approximation for the
“worst case” performance of the classifier. We selected these pairs for manual labeling because
they exhibited some degree of similarity, based on the L2 norm of the comparison feature vector,
anticipating that they would be among the most difficult points to classify. As noted previously,
plotting the ROC curve on all of the labeled data, or on the entire test set, shows near perfect
classification.
Because we anticipate that most account pairs belong to different users, maintaining a low false
positive misclassification rate is important. A small false positive rate could equate to a large
number of misclassified points. For this reason, we select a false positive threshold of 2% on the
hand-labeled ROC curve. This threshold leads us to a classification probability threshold of 0.782,
as indicated in Figure 4. In other words, we assign a classification yˆ(i,j) to a profile pair (x(i),x(j))
according to the function
yˆ(i,j) =
1
(
1 + eβ
T φ(i,j)+β0
)−1
≥ 0.782
0
(
1 + eβ
T φ(i,j)+β0
)−1
< 0.782.
(3)
Based only on the hand-labeled data ROC, we expect this classifier to correctly identify over
80% of account pairs belonging to the same user while misclassifying less than 2% of the account
pairs belonging to different users. Because the manually labeled data consists of account pairs that
exhibit some substantial measure of similarity, we expect performance on the entire data set to be
much better, similar to the near-perfect classification on the test data.
Klausen, Marks, and Zaman: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks
17
Figure 5 Graph representation of accounts belonging to the same user using our regression model and equation
(3) with a threshold of 0.782.
When we apply the classifier in equation (3) to the entire data set, we obtain 318 account
pairs classified as belonging to the same user. Sixty-two of these pairs have the same account ID
and are therefore known to be from the same account, while the remaining 256 pairs come from
different Twitter accounts. Figure 5 provides a network representation of these account connections.
Each node in the plot represents a unique Twitter account. An edge drawn between two accounts
indicates our classification equation labels the pair of accounts as belonging to the same user. Only
accounts with at least one edge are depicted in Figure 5.
Most of the components in the graph depicted in Figure 5 are fully connected, which is as
we would expect. Component A is an example of a fully connected component, consisting of five
Twitter accounts. These account profile features are listed in Table 7. They are all very similar
and indeed appear to belong to the same user.
Component B, on the other hand, consists of three accounts but is not fully connected. Table 8
provides a list of the profile features associated with these three accounts. While they all appear
to belong to the same user, comparison of the first and third profiles given in the table resulted in
probability P(y(i,j) = 1) = 0.774, which falls below our classification threshold. While in this case
these two accounts are connected by way of a third account that meets the classification threshold
with both of them, it is clear that setting threshold this high does indeed miss some pairs of
accounts that probably do belong to the same user. We discuss the sensitivity of the results as a
function of the classification threshold in Appendix C.
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Table 7 Accounts comprising component A. While average hash values for profile pictures are abbreviated, they
are the same for all profiles.
Screen Name Name Profile Pic
AlJabarti28 Abu Yusuf Al-Jabarti 20. . . 00
BanuKombe Abu Yusuf Al-Jabarti 20. . . 00
enkorela Abu Yusuf Al-Jabarti 20. . . 00
ouaicheu Abu Yusuf Al-Jabarti 20. . . 00
ouaisheu Abu Yusuf Al-Jabarti 20. . . 00
Table 8 Accounts comprising component B.
Screen Name Name Profile Pic
Aqidahhaqq Colonel Shaami [None]
AnsarAlUmmah49 Colonel Shaami [None]
buruan8 Colonel Shaami [None]
5. Refollowing Model
In the previous section we used machine learning to produce a method for efficiently finding groups
of accounts that are likely to belong to a single user. In this section, we use the account clusters
produced from this method in an effort to learn how users tend to reconnect, or refollow, other
user accounts when opening a new account.
Suppose a user t has his account suspended and decides to open a new account. After getting
the account open, t decides to follow some other users. We have observed that in many cases, t will
refollow at least some of the user accounts he was previously following with his suspended account,
and it seems reasonable to assume that any suspended user would want to reconnect with some of
the same people he or she was following prior to suspension.
In this section we fit a probability model that assigns a value to each of t’s former friends, giving
the probability t will refollow the former friend upon opening a new Twitter account. We again
turn to logistic regression as a means to producing this probability model.
5.1. Data
Using the logistic regression model from Section 4 with a cutoff of 0.782, we grouped the seed
accounts into clusters, each of which we assume belong to the same user. A network representation
of the non-singleton clusters is shown in Figure 5. Accounts in each cluster were then sorted by
account age. After sorting, we compared the friend lists of each pair of consecutive accounts. For
each friend of the former account, we created a row in our data set labeled with an indicator of
whether or not the same friend was connected to the latter account.
For example, user account #3280844606 (@MusabGharieb18) and user account #3343999888
(@MusabGharieb13) are consecutive accounts belonging to the same user cluster. Table 9 shows
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Table 9 Example of @MusabGharieb18’s (@M. . . 18) refollowing behavior upon opening new account
@MusabGharieb13 (@M. . . 13).
Friend @M. . . 18 @ M. . . 13
@poorslave 3 YES YES
@enkorela YES NO
@StillUkhtMaryam YES YES
@Yaqub London YES NO
whether each account was following certain friend accounts. Table 10 shows how each of @Mus-
abGharieb18’s friends would then generate a row in the data for this logistic regression model.
Table 10 Example data rows resulting from refollowing behavior given in Table 9. Features are omitted but
include, for example, characteristics from each friend’s profile.
Friend Features
Refollowed
(Response)
@poorslave 3 · · · 1
@enkorela · · · -1
@StillUkhtMaryam · · · 1
@Yaqub London · · · -1
5.2. Features
In order to obtain a good fit, we included features from the suspended user’s earlier account (e.g.,
@MusabGharieb18) as well as features from the friend account (e.g., @poorslave). For a suspended
user account User0 that was following account Friend, we construct a variety of features which
can be broken down into different categories. One set of features deals with the features of the
individual accounts of User0 and Friend. A related set of features are about the similarity of
the two accounts. There is a category of features that deals with the interactions between the two
accounts. Finally, there is a category of features that describe aggregate properties of the neighbors
of User0. A complete list of the features used in our model can be found in Appendix D.
5.3. Kernel Logistic Regression
Intuitively, some interactions among our set of features might be more predictive than the features
themselves. For example, the average number of User0’s friends might not be very useful in esti-
mating the probability User0 refollows a specific Friend account. However, this value multiplied
by Friend’s number of Twitter friends could be very useful. For this reason, we use a quadratic
kernel in this logistic regression model, which ensures the regression is fit on all linear and quadratic
terms, including pairwise interactions:
K(x,y) = (1 + xTy)2
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Given a training data set {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the corresponding logistic regression model is
pˆ(x) =
(
1 + e
∑N
i=1 αiK(x,xi)
)−1
.
The parameters α= (α1, . . . , αN) are fit on the training data using an L2-regularized log loss:
α= arg min
αˆ
N∑
i=1
log(1 + e−yi
∑N
i′=1 αˆiK(xi,xi′ )) +λαˆT αˆ,
where yi is the response in the ith row of the training data. These responses take value -1 if the
Friend was not refollowed, or 1 if the Friend was refollowed, as annotated in Table 10. The
parameter λ serves as the regularization coefficient.
5.4. Performance
In order to fit this model we used gradient-based optimization methods available in Python’s scipy
package [17]. We first selected training (50%), validation (25%), and test (25%) sets randomly
from all of the rows of the data and normalized the entire data set based on the values in the
training data. Through validation we found that λ= 10−5 provided the highest AUC. Performance
on out-of-sample test data is depicted in Figure 6.
AUC = 0.663AUC = 0.798
Figure 6 ROC curve for L2-regularized quadratic kernel logistic regression performance on out-of-sample test
data. (left) Test data and training and validation data can contain the same user. (right) Test data and
training and validation data do not contain the same users.
From the figure it appears that we can predict with some accuracy which former friends a
suspended user is likely to reconnect with. It is possible, however, that the model is learning
refollowing preferences of individual users in the data set. To investigate this possibility, we selected
new training, validation, and test sets by randomly selecting different user clusters for each and
included all of the rows corresponding to these user clusters in the corresponding set. In other words,
each component depicted in Figure 5 was assigned as a whole to either the training, validation, or
Klausen, Marks, and Zaman: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks
21
test data, approximately maintaining the 50%-25%-25% ratios. Unlike the previous data partition,
this constraint would ensure that all of the rows in Table 10 went to the same set, because they
belong to the same user.
Using this new data partition, validation and testing were completed on data consisting of
entirely different users than those that provided the training data. Through validation we found
that λ= 10−4 provided the highest AUC on this new data partition. Out-of-sample performance
suffered, as can be seen in the ROC plot in Figure 6. Comparing the performance on each partition
provides some interesting insights. First, the AUC for the new partition in Figure 6 is 0.66, which
indicates that there is some underlying refollowing behavior that transcends the users in our data.
However, our ability to predict whether or not a suspended user will refollow an old friend increases
substantially when we include that user’s past behavior in the training data. The difference in
performance gives us an idea of how useful it is to have data on a specific user’s past behavior
when predicting whom the user will refollow.
Because we used a quadratic kernal logistic regression, the expressions for the fit models are not
easy to interpret. Their performance shows that we can predict with some accuracy the refollowing
behavior of a suspended user, even in the absence of previous refollowing behavior, based solely on
the refollowing behavior of others. We make use of this capability in the next section, where we
develop a method to search for a suspended user’s new account. In practice an analyst might be
able to produce a much better model for a specific user by carefully incorporating past refollowing
behavior, if available.
6. Suspended User Search
We now make use of our findings from the previous sections to address another relevant problem.
We have observed multiple incidences in our data of suspended users quickly creating a new Twitter
account in order to continue their unethical activity, as exemplified in Table 3. In these instances
it would be useful for those tasked with monitoring nefarious users, such as social media service
providers or intelligence community personnel, to find an efficient way to search for the suspended
user’s new account.
We assume we are given a target user whose account has been suspended by Twitter. We have
stored the target user’s account information, including lists of the target’s friends and followers.
From this information we wish to locate the target user’s new Twitter account, if one exists, as
efficiently as possible. Our approach to solving this problem is to query the followers of each of
the target user’s known Twitter “friend” accounts, prior to suspension, and search the results for
a new account belonging to the target user.
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Our network search model builds directly on the multi-urn search model presented in [21] and is
illustrated in Figure 7. We can think of each of the target’s former friends i as an urn containing
Ni marbles, which represent the neighbors of i. If the target has connected to former friend i, then
he is among i’s neighbors and a single red marble is one of the Ni marbles in urn i. Excepting
these red marbles, all marbles in all urns are blue.
Each follower query can be thought of as choosing a nonempty urn j in the multi-urn model
and removing some fixed number of its marbles. The number of marbles removed is determined
by the query method used and, unlike the search model in [21], can be more than one. Having
a red marble among those removed represents finding the target user’s account, and the search
terminates.
Figure 7 Network search representation as a multi-urn model.
6.1. Suspended User Search Model
Let V be the set of known friend accounts. These are the accounts that the target user was following
prior to begin suspended. For each known friend i ∈ V, let Ni be the number of Twitter accounts
that are following i. These quantities are easily obtained through the Twitter API.
Using the Twitter API it is possible to obtain a list of the followers of a specified user, pro-
vided the user has not enabled privacy protection on the account. Twitter offers two methods for
executing these queries: GET followers/list and GET followers/ids. Both methods are rate
limited to 15 queries within any 15-minute time period. GET followers/list returns standard
Twitter user profile information for each follower, but only returns up to 200 profiles per query.
GET followers/ids has the same rate limit, but returns up to 5,000 user IDs per query [30].
Each method can be cursored so that subsequent queries of the same user continue to produce
unique results, until all of the user’s followers’ profiles or IDs have been obtained. For our analysis,
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we set NM as the maximum number of unique followers obtained per query, although in practice
we assume this number to be 5,000 as established in the GET followers/ids method. Therefore if
we have queried user i’s followers n times, we expect the next query of user i’s followers to return
min{NM ,Ni−nNM} new results, provided i still has unqueried followers (Ni−nNM > 0).
Additionally, we make the following assumptions:
1. After being suspended, the target user creates a new account with probability ρ0, which we
refer to as the a priori existence probability. If the target has not created a new account, then he
does not have a node in the network and will not be found through follower queries. The value of
ρ0 quantifies the searcher’s belief that the target exists in the network.
2. If the target user creates a new account, he reconnects with each former friend i ∈ V with
some probability ϕi, which can be estimated from previous account data as was done in Section 5.
We refer to this as the reconnection probability to former friend i.
3. Reconnections to former friends are independent; whether or not the search target reconnects
with former friend i does not affect the probability he reconnects with former friend j 6= i.
4. If the target user is following user i ∈ V, then each account returned in each query of i’s
followers is equally likely to be the target’s account.
5. The searcher can quickly and accurately determine whether an account obtained from a
follower query is the target user’s account. This can be done using the approach developed in
Section 4.
The search process is modeled as the execution of follower queries in discrete stages. In each
stage t ∈ 0,1, . . . ,N − 1, the searcher chooses one of the target user’s former friend accounts and
executes a follower query. Here, N is the total number of queries required to examine all of the
followers of all former friends, and is assumed to be finite. If the target user’s new account is among
the query results, the search terminates. Otherwise, the searcher executes another query unless all
N queries have been exhausted or the searcher concludes that the target has not created a new
account.
The objective of the search is to minimize the total number of queries. In order to remain
consistent with the multi-urn search model in [21], we do not consider the cost of a query that
succeeds in returning the target user’s new account. Therefore, the objective in our search model
is to minimize the number of unsuccessful search queries. The best result possible would be to find
the search target in the first query, in which case there are zero unsuccessful queries. Because of
the stochastic nature of this process, we say that a search policy is optimal if it minimizes the
expected number of unsuccessful queries.
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6.2. Initialization
We assume that data collected on the target user provides a list of known former friend accounts.
Using the Twitter API, it is relatively easy to determine which of these accounts are still active,
whether or not they are “private,” and their follower counts. We initialize set V as the set of all
former friend accounts that are active at the time of search execution, that have followers that can
be queried (i.e., have a positive number of followers and are not “private” accounts). We use the
follower counts for these accounts to initialize Ni, i∈ V.
This search model also requires an initial probability that the target user would reconnect with
each former friend i ∈ V, given he has created a new account. Let A be the event that the target
has created a new account, Bi be the event that the target is following former friend i ∈ V, and
B =
⋃
i∈V Bi be the event that the target has reconnected with at least one former friend. From
our definitions above, we can write ϕi = P(Bi|A). We can obtain the value of this probability using
the approach presented in Section 5. Note that event B can also be interpreted as the event we
can find the target user by exhaustively querying the followers of all former friends. Using our
independence assumption we have
P(Bc|A) = 1−P(B|A) =
∏
i∈V
(1−ϕi).
We also must select a value for the a priori existence probability ρ0,which can be done based
on the beliefs of experts in the relevant domain. As the search process progresses, the conditional
existence probability will evolve. The search terminates if the target user is found or all follower
queries are exhausted. In addition to these criteria, a searcher might want to terminate the search
upon achieving reasonable certainty that the target user has not created a new account. We allow
for this termination criterion by including a termination conditional existence probability ρ¯. If at
any stage the conditional existence probability falls below ρ¯, the search terminates and the searcher
concludes that the target has not created an identifiable new account. If ρ¯ is set to zero, then the
search continues until the target is found or until all follower queries are exhausted.
6.3. The Discrete Stochastic Search Process
As we have suggested, the search process can be modeled as a set of urns, each representing a
former friend. Urn i∈ V has Ni marbles, which represent former friend i’s followers. In each stage
the searcher chooses a former friend (or urn) and executes a follower query, receiving up to NM
results (or drawing at most NM marbles from the urn). The search continues until one of the
following occurs:
• The target’s new account is found (a red marble is among those drawn),
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• The probability the target has created a new account falls below the termination probability
ρ¯
• The queries of former friends’ followers are exhausted (there are no marbles left in any of the
urns).
6.3.1. Policy Suppose we consider a valid policy as any sequence of former friend queries
in which each former friend is exactly exhaustively queried. In other words, if we let u =
(u0, u1, . . . , uN−1) be a policy in which former friend ut ∈ V is queried in stage t, then u is valid if
and only if
|{t : ut = i}|=
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
∀ i∈ V.
Notice that any valid policy can be completely specified in advance as an ordering of follower
queries that is executed until one of the three termination criteria are met. As long as the target
is not found, state transitions are deterministic and can be enumerated a priori. Except for the
decision to terminate, there is no benefit to making policy decisions during the search. Unsuccessful
search results do not provide any additional insight into which ordering of queries might yield a
lower cost.
6.3.2. System State and Transitions In order to analyze the dynamics of the system
we define the system state, x(t), at stage t as either a |V|-dimensional vector in which the ith
element xi(t) is the number of follower queries that have been executed on former friend i ∈ V in
previous stages, or a terminal state, “Terminate.” At stage t= 0, no queries have been executed
and presumably the search has not terminated, so that x(0) = 0. In any non-terminal state, let the
vector x(t) be specified as a function of the policy being executed:
xi(t) = |{` < t : u` = i}| ∀ i∈ V. (4)
State transitions in this system are a function of the current state, the policy, and a stochastic
input representing whether the target account is found as a result of the current stage query. Let
w(x(t), i) =
{
0, Target is not found querying i from state x(t)
1, Target is found querying i from state x(t).
We now have all of the definitions needed to write the state transition function that governs this
search model.
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), ut,w(x(t), ut))
=
{
“Terminate,′′ w(x(t), ut) = 1 or other termination criterion are met
x(t) + eut , otherwise.
Here, ei represents the ith unit vector.
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6.4. Search Process Dynamics
We define the function
ψi(u, t) = max
{
xi(t)NM
Ni
,1
}
=

xi(t)NM
Ni
xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
1 xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
as the fraction of former friend i’s followers that have been queried before stage t when executing
valid policy u (or, using the urn analogy, the fraction of marbles that have been removed from urn i
at stage t), conditioned on not having found the target user prior to stage t. This function captures
the assumption that, provided former friend i has more than NM unqueried followers remaining in
stage t, the query returns NM followers. If former friend i has fewer than NM unqueried followers
remaining in stage t, then the query will return all of the remaining unqueried followers.
This function is strictly increasing at a constant rate of NM
Ni
as xi(t) increases from 0 to
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1.
It continues to increase, at a possibly slower rate, in the
(
d Ni
NM
e
)
th query of former friend i. Because
xi(t) is nondecreasing in t, we can conclude that ψi(u, t) is also nondecreasing in t.
For example, suppose a certain former friend has 12,000 followers and that each follower query
returns at most NM = 5,000 followers. Then, the first and second query of this former friend will
return 5,000 followers each, while the final query will only return 2,000 followers. In general, we
expect the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 follower queries of former friend i ∈ V to return NM results, while the
final query returns Ni−
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
NM results. This irregularity results in final queries of former
friends to affect the system dynamics differently than the preceding queries of the same former
friends.
6.4.1. Conditional Existence Probability We now develop an expression for the condi-
tional existence probability, i.e., the probability that the target user has created a new account
conditioned on having reached a certain non-terminal state, x(t). Let A be the event that the
target user has created a new account. For simplicity of notation, we condition directly on the state
vector x(t) to denote the event that this state has been reached without finding a target user’s
new account, so that ρ(t) = P(A|u,x(t)) is the new account existence probability conditioned on
having reached state x(t) when executing valid search policy u without having found the target
account. Note that ρ(0) = ρ0, the initialization value.
Using Bayes’ rule, the conditional existence probability is
ρ(t) = ρ0
( ∏
i∈V (1−ψi(u, t)ϕi)
1− ρ0 + ρ0
∏
i∈V (1−ψi(u, t)ϕi)
)
.
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The terms inside the products are the probabilities of not finding the target account among the
followers of each former friend i, given that ψi(u, t) of those followers have been queried and
examined. Multiplying these probabilities together implicitly relies on our assumption that the
target user reconnects to his former friends independently.
The expression for ρ(t) is the initial existence probability multiplied by a ratio of two linear
functions of the product
∏
i∈V(1−ψi(u, t)ϕi). Because ψi(u, t)≤ 1 ∀i∈ V and is nondecreasing in t,∏
i∈V(1−ψi(u, t)ϕi) is nonincreasing in t. The coefficient in the denominator (ρ0) is no more than
that of the numerator (1), and therefore the conditional existence probability is nonincreasing in t
and converges to 0 as
∏
i∈V(1−ψi(u, t)ϕi) decreases to 0. This monotonicity property aligns with
intuition: the more the social network is searched without finding the target user, the less likely it
is that the target user exists in the network.
Other than the conditional existence probability at each stage, the value of the initial existence
probability ρ0 does not affect the system dynamics. Implicit in the execution of the search is the
assumption that the search target has created a new account and reconnected to former friends
in a way that can be represented by a probability model. The utility of including an existence
probability in the model is that it enables the searcher set a search termination criterion when he
is sufficiently convinced that the target user has not created a new account, based on the value of
the conditional existence probability.
6.4.2. Conditional Reconnection Probabilities The conditional probability that the tar-
get user has reconnected with former friend i, given he has created a new account and that has
not been found by stage t when applying search policy u, can also be calculated using Bayes’ Rule.
Recall that A is the event that the target user created a new account and Bi is the event that the
the target user has reconnected with friend i. Then we have
P(Bi|A,u,x(t)) = P(xi(t)|Bi,u,A)P(Bi|u,A)P(xi(t)|Bi,u,A)P(Bi|u,A) + (1−P(Bi|u,A))
=ϕi
(
1−ψi(u, t)
1−ψi(u, t)ϕi
)
=
ϕi
(
Ni−xi(t)NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)
, xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
0 xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
Observe that this probability is the original probability multiplied by the ratio of two linear
functions of xi(t). Because the numerator decreases at a faster rate than the denominator, this
probability is strictly decreasing as xi(t) increases from 0 to d NiNM e, provided ϕi > 0. Just as with
the conditional existence probability, the monotonicity of this conditional probability matches
intuition: the more we query the followers of a certain former friend without finding the target, the
less likely it becomes that the target has reconnected with this former friend.
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6.4.3. Distribution of w(x(t), i) The probability of finding the target when querying former
friend i∈ V from state x(t) is found using the multiplication rule. Note that the event
{w(x(t), i) = 1} ⊆Bi ⊆A.
Therefore,
P(w(x(t), i) = 1) = P(w(x(t), i) = 1|Bi,A,x(t))P(Bi|A,x(t))P(A|x(t))
=
ϕi
(
NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)(
ρ0
∏
j∈V (1−ψj(u,t)ϕj)
1−ρ0+ρ0
∏
j∈V (1−ψj(u,t)ϕj)
)
, xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2
)
ϕi
(
Ni−xi(t)NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)(
ρ0
∏
j∈V (1−ψj(u,t)ϕj)
1−ρ0+ρ0
∏
j∈V (1−ψj(u,t)ϕj)
)
, xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1.
This expression offers several important insights into the dynamics of this search model. First
note that conditioned on the existence of a new target account,
P(w(x(t), i) = 1|A,x(t)) =
ϕi
(
NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)
xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2
)
ϕi
(
Ni−xi(t)NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)
xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1,
(5)
P(w(x(t), i) = 0|A,x(t)) =

(
Ni−ϕixi(t+1)NM
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM
)
xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2
)
(1−ϕi)Ni
Ni−ϕixi(t)NM xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1.
(6)
We refer to equation (5) as the probability of success when querying former friend i from state
x(t). Likewise, equation (6) is the failure probability when querying former friend i from state x(t).
Given the target user has created a new account, the success probability for a specific friend i∈ V
is strictly increasing as xi(t) increases from 0 to
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2, and is therefore nondecreasing over
the corresponding stages t. However, this monotonicity property does not always hold for the final
query. As we have discussed, the final query of i does not necessarily return the same number (NM)
of results as previous queries of i, and has a different functional form for probability of success
given in equation (5).
Figure 8 illustrates this monotonicity property for two initial conditions. In both of the plotted
trajectories,
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
= 20. For former friend 1, N1 mod NM = 0 and all queries return the same
number (NM) of results. In this case the probability of finding the target is strictly increasing
over all queries of this former friend’s followers. The second former friend’s success probabilities
depicted in Figure 8 do not have this characteristic, and the final query returns fewer results than
the previous 19 queries. In this case, we observe that the probability of finding the target is strictly
increasing over the first 19 queries, but decreases in the final query because this query returns
fewer results.
This monotonicity property is an extension of the monotonicity theorem provided in [21]. As a
final note on this property, we observe that this result holds even if we remove the conditioning
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Figure 8 Probability of finding the target user’s new account, given it exists, as a function of number of queries
of former friend j.
on A. If in stage t the searcher queried the followers of former friend i and did not find the target
user, then in stage t+ 1,
P(w(x(t+ 1), i) = 1)> P(w(x(t), i) = 1),
for all 0≤ xi(t+ 1)<
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1, ϕi > 0, and ρ(t)> 0.
6.5. Analysis: ρ¯= 0
We provide analysis for the case in which we initialize ρ¯= 0, i.e., we continue to search until either
the target account is found or all follower queries have been exhausted. If we were searching for a
suspended user’s new account, one course of action would be to first execute the query that was
most likely to reveal the account. However, we have shown in [21] that this approach does not
always yield the optimal policy. In this section we provide a characterization of the optimal policy
that naturally extends from the optimality condition derived in [21] for independent urns.
6.5.1. Expression for Expected Policy Cost We now derive an expression for policy cost
when ρ¯= 0. Let u be a valid police and Cu be the number of unsuccessful queries, or cost of policy
u. Because C can only take nonnegative integral values 0,1, . . . ,N ,
E[Cu] =
N−1∑
t=0
P(Cu > t)
=
N−1∑
t=0
P(Cu > t|A)P(A) +
N−1∑
t=0
P(Cu > t|Ac)P(Ac)
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= ρ0
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
P(w(x(t), ut) = 0|A) +N(1− ρ0). (7)
The optimal search policy is the valid policy that minimizes this expression. Formally,
u? = arg min
u∈U
E[Cu]
= arg min
u∈U
{
ρ0
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
P(w(x(t), ut) = 0|A) +N(1− ρ0)
}
= arg min
u∈U
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
P(w(x(t), ut) = 0|A). (8)
where u? is the optimal policy and U is the set of valid policies. Recall from equation (4) that the
vectors x(t) can be written as a function of the the search policy. Not surprisingly, if we commit
to exhausting all possible queries in our search for the target, the initial existence probability ρ0
does not affect policy optimality.
In order to simplify notation, we define the probability qu(t) = P(w(x(t), ut) = 0|A). This is the
probability of failing to find the target’s new account when executing the tth query in policy u.
This probability is specified in equation (6), and allows us to rewrite the objective function in
equation (8) as
u? = arg min
u∈U
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(t).
6.5.2. Optimality Conditions In [21] it is shown that there exists a block policy, in which
each urn i ∈ V is exhaustively queried before moving on to another urn, that is optimal in any
multi-urn search problem. We now provide an analogous result for this specific application which
is proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (Necessary Conditions for Optimality) If in a suspended user search, follower
queries of former friends are executed until either the target user is found or all queries have been
exhausted, then any optimal policy must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) The first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1 queries of each former friend i∈ V are executed in succession in a single
block.
(2) For all friends i∈ V such that
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
>
Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM +NM
) , (9)
all
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
queries of i’s followers are executed in succession.
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The first part of Theorem 1 follows from the monotonicity of the success probability. If querying
former friend i is optimal in stage t, and in the next stage (t+ 1) the success probability for i has
increased while success probabilities for all j ∈ V \ i have remained the same, then intuitively it
would be optimal to query i again in stage t+ 1.
The condition in equation (9) is related to how the success probability changes in the final query
of each former friend. If
Nj
NMϕj
− 1
2
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
>
Nj(1−ϕj)
ϕj
(
Nj −
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
NM +NM
) ,
then the final query of i has a lower cost than the previous queries of i. This is the case depicted in
Figure 8 for former friend 1. In this case, querying all of i’s followers in succession starting at any
stage t is more valuable than executing only the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries, and any optimal policy
will include all of these queries in a single block.
If on the other hand
Nj
NMϕj
− 1
2
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
<
Nj(1−ϕj)
ϕj
(
Nj −
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
NM +NM
) ,
then the final query of former friend i has a higher cost than the previous query. This is the case of
former friend 2 depicted in Figure 8. In this case querying all of i’s followers in succession starting
at any stage t is less beneficial, in terms of minimizing cost, than executing only the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1
queries. The optimal policy might separate the final query of i from the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries in
this case.
If the inequality in equation (9) is instead satisfied with equality, then executing all of the queries
of i’s followers in succession from any stage t essentially provides the same benefit as executing
only the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries. In this case, an optimal policy will always exist in which these
queries are executed together in a single block, but alternative policies with equal cost might also
exist in which the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries of i are separated from the final query.
Theorem 1 establishes that the optimal policy is a block policy, but it does not specify the details
of this policy. The following theorem, which is proved Appendix B, provides a full characterization
of an optimal policy.
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Theorem 2 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimality) In a suspended user
search, define
γ(x(t), i) =

1
ϕi
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− NM
2Ni
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
− 1,
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
> Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
) ,
xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1;
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
,
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
≤ Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
) ,
xi(t) = 0,1, . . . ,
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2;
Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
) ,
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
≤ Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
) ,
xi(t) =
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1;
∞, otherwise.
A valid policy is optimal if and only if it satisfies the condition in Theorem 1 and it minimizes
γ(x(t), i) in each stage, i.e.,
ut = arg min
i∈V
γ(x(t), i) t= 0,1, . . . ,N − 1.
The function γ(x(τ), i) arises in the proof of Theorem 2 when comparing the costs of policies
which swap the order of querying former friend i with another former friend. Theorem 2 simply
says that always choosing the former friend that minimizes γ(x(τ), i) produces an optimal policy.
The different cases for γ(x(τ), i) correspond to different remaining followers to query of the former
friends along with the optimality conditions from Theorem 1. The first case corresponds to the
condition in equation 9. As discussed, this condition implies that executing all queries of i in a
single block is more beneficial than executing only the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries. The other cases
follow similar logic: the second case is the value function for the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries of former
friend i, and the condition indicates that executing only these queries in a single block is best. The
third case is for the final query of former friend i, and the fourth condition sets γ(x(t), i) to infinity
if there are no queries remaining for i.
6.6. Results
Using the classification results from Section 4, we identified 169 account pairs from our ISIS seed
users for testing. Each pair of accounts consisted of an earlier account, which had been suspended,
and an account opened later that belonged to the same user. Without being able to verify exactly
when account suspensions took place, we assumed the later account in each case was opened or
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Table 11 Randomly selected account pairs for testing.
Pair Former friends Reconnection % Max Queries (N)
1 35 40.00% 38
2 310 59.68% 6609
3 94 17.02% 247
4 87 21.84% 431
5 185 8.11% 198
6 84 22.62% 101
7 63 9.52% 12007
8 189 4.23% 2078
9 257 88.72% 4312
10 109 30.28% 152
11 302 82.12% 5559
12 344 22.67% 1314
13 181 9.94% 190
14 87 3.45% 2965
15 221 2.26% 2654
used in response to the former account’s suspension. Having collected the friends and followers lists
for all of these accounts, we were able to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the search
policy we developed.
From the set of 169 account pairs, we randomly chose 15 for testing. Table 11 shows the number
of former friends, the reconnection rate, and the total number of queries possible (or policy length)
for each of these account pairs. For each account pair, we identified the friends from the earlier
(suspended) account as the “former friends” of the subsequent account. For each of these former
friends we determined their reconnection probability using the logistic regression classifier from
Section 5. We also had the number of followers for each former friend stored in our data set.
We assumed that all of the former friend accounts were still active when the second account was
opened. Finally, we initialized ρ0 = 1. This initial value is useful because it reduces the expression
for expected policy cost to the objective function in equation (8) and allows for direct comparison
of actual performance with our theoretical expected number of unsuccessful queries.
In order to evaluate policy performance, we consider the following policies:
• Optimal. This is a policy that minimizes expected cost, found using the necessary and sufficient
conditions in Theorem 2.
• Greedy. This policy maximizes the probability of finding the new account at each stage.
Because this probability strictly increases for each former friend i ∈ V every time i is queried,
excepting the final query of i, this policy always meets the necessary condition for optimality given
in Theorem 1.
• Min-N . This policy selects the former friend with the minimum number of unqueried followers
at each stage. Because these values strictly decrease for each former friend i ∈ V with each query
of i, this policy always meets the necessary condition for optimality given in Theorem 1.
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• Max-P . This policy selects the former friend with the highest conditional reconnection proba-
bility at each stage. Because conditional reconnection probabilities strictly decrease for each former
friend i∈ V with each query of i, this policy does not necessarily meet the conditions in Theorem
2.
• Random. This policy randomly chooses a query from those that are possible at each stage.
6.6.1. Comparison of Expected Costs We computed the expected cost for each policy
using equation (7). These values do not account for our knowledge of the true reconnections of
the second account in each case. Instead, we assume that our probability model is correct in these
computations.
Table 12 Cost comparisons for different policies.
Expected Costs Actual Costs
Pair Optimal Greedy Min-N Max-P Random Optimal Greedy Min-N Max-P Random
1 5.72 5.74 9.18 5.89 7.93 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.74 1.70
2 2.26 2.27 4.15 88.23 68.87 0.00 0.00 2.00 44.16 20.97
3 1.22 1.22 2.00 6.09 4.91 1.00 1.00 6.00 6.28 11.63
4 1.20 1.20 2.74 20.48 8.90 2.00 2.00 15.00 26.81 20.79
5 2.96 2.96 9.27 3.36 6.19 5.00 5.00 15.00 6.56 10.75
6 0.96 0.96 2.52 4.43 1.86 1.00 1.00 7.00 5.53 4.49
7 103.51 103.98 107.53 400.48 2170.52 5.00 5.00 12.00 283.13 1582.28
8 4.98 5.10 9.05 74.36 71.86 6.00 6.00 136.00 82.50 242.40
9 2.28 2.28 4.73 80.68 57.27 0.00 0.00 2.00 54.75 5.87
10 1.01 1.01 2.99 8.64 2.27 3.00 3.00 3.00 13.76 3.27
11 0.89 0.89 2.02 126.65 38.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 111.03 18.18
12 2.88 2.88 6.98 42.15 18.78 0.00 0.00 6.00 44.57 19.57
13 1.50 1.50 3.82 3.26 2.52 1.00 1.00 10.00 3.41 9.57
14 8.84 8.85 15.28 141.16 322.96 4.00 4.00 52.00 150.62 736.53
15 1.17 1.17 2.84 61.06 20.02 7.00 7.00 61.00 143.00 390.86
Table 12 gives the expected costs computed for each policy. Expected cost values are analytically
computed in all cases except for the random policy. In order to estimate expected cost for a random
policy, we generated 500 random policies and computed the expected cost for each. The average
of these 500 expected costs is reported as the random policy expected cost in Table 12.
The results show that in many cases, the greedy policy and the optimal policy achieve the same
cost. Comparison of these two policies reveals that they are very similar in all cases. This finding
agrees with the findings in [21], which also suggests that there is a bound on the suboptimality of
the greedy policy. The Min-N policy also produces costs close to those of the optimal and greedy
policies, while the Max-P and random policies have a substantially higher costs in many cases.
6.6.2. Comparison of Actual Costs In this section we compare the performance of the
different policies in finding the target user based on the actual reconnections. If the target users
tended to reconnect in accordance with our probability model we would expect these actual cost
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values to be similar to the expected costs in Table 12. In cases in which the target user reconnected
to former friends in a way that would be very unlikely according to our probability model, the
actual policy costs might differ substantially from the expected costs. The actual costs for each
policy are reported in Table 12. The values reported are the expected number of queries one would
have to execute before finding the target user, conditional on the target user’s actual reconnections.
In some of the 15 cases, the actual costs in Table 12 differ substantially from the expected costs.
However, the same trend holds: the optimal and greedy policies tend to perform the best, and are
nearly indistinguishable in terms of costs. The Min-N policy performs as well or nearly as well as
the optimal policy in some cases, but in a few cases it is much worse. The Max-P and random
policies tend to perform poorly, especially when the target user has not connected with very many
former friends (see Table 11). Using the optimal or greedy policies can result in substantial cost
savings in these cases.
Account pair 1 provides an example of a case where a random policy can outperform the optimal
policy in practice. The reconnection rate for this target user was 40% (from Table 11), but the
target did not reconnect with the most probable former friends, according to our probability model
(in actuality, it is possible these accounts were suspended when the target opened the new account).
From Table 11, it is apparent that most of the 35 former friends have fewer than 5,000 followers,
because the valid policy length is at most 38 queries. The random policy performs approximately as
we would expect in this case: each random query has approximately a 40% chance of returning the
target. From the well-known geometric probability distribution, the expected number of failures
before the first success is 1.5, which is very close the value reported in Table 12.
In each of the 15 account pairs, the optimal, greedy and Min-N policies located the target
user when querying a former friend that had fewer than 5,000 followers. For this reason, the
actual number of queries in these cases was deterministic, resulting in the integer costs reported
in the Table 12. For pair 15, for example, the optimal policy would always find the target user
on the 8th query because this is the first former friend in the policy to whom the target user had
reconnected, and a single query retrieves all of this former friend’s followers. In this application,
many of the former friend accounts have fewer than 5,000 followers and are therefore exhausted
in a single followers query. These accounts, when coupled with a high reconnection probability,
are very valuable in a search policy. Both the greedy and the optimal policies prioritize queries of
former friends with relatively high reconnection probabilities and low numbers of followers.
6.7. Discussion: ρ¯ > 0
When an existence probability threshold is applied as a termination criterion, Theorems 1 and 2
no longer hold. However, the queries that have the highest probability of finding the target user
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are also the queries that have the largest effect on reducing the conditional existence probability.
We conjecture that the optimal policy in the case for which ρ¯ > 0 will be the same as the optimal
policy when ρ¯= 0 in the initial queries. At some point, a stage is reached for which a greedy policy
becomes more desirable, because it reaches the termination criterion ρt < ρ¯ earlier than a ρ¯ = 0
optimal policy characterized by the conditions in Theorems 1 and 2.
A final consideration for the case in which ρ¯ > 0 involves the initial condition. The values that
conditional existence probability ρ(t) take all depend explicitly on the initial existence probabil-
ity ρ0. This sensitivity should be explored in analyses or execution of searches that employ this
termination criterion.
7. Conclusion
The growth of online extremism has created the need for capabilities to mitigate the threat posed
by the abusive or threatening behavior of these extremist users. In this work we have developed a
set of capabilities which allow for more effective mitigation of these threats. These capabilities can
be used to enhance the performance of law enforcement or other entities that are responsible for
protecting the public from online extremist groups. Our approach combined statistical modeling of
extremist behavior with optimized search policies. Our behavioral modeling allowed us to predict
new extremist users, determine if two accounts belong to the same extremist user, and predict the
network connections of suspended extremist users when they create new accounts. We used our
behavioral models to formulate a network search policy to find the new accounts of suspended
extremist users when they return to the social network. Simulations based on actual ISIS users
found that our policy was much more efficient than other benchmark approaches.
While our analysis focused on terrorist extremist groups such as ISIS in the social network Twit-
ter, the capabilities we developed can apply to any online extremist group and any social network.
Nothing in our modeling or search policy is specialized to ISIS or Twitter. Users that engage in
some form of online extremism or harassment will have very similar behavioral characteristics in
social networks. They will connect to a specific set of users which form their extremist group. They
will create new accounts which will resemble their old accounts after being suspended. When they
return to the social network after being suspended, they will reconnect with certain former friends
with higher probability. In addition, all of our capabilities do not require the cooperation of social
network operators. Therefore, all the capabilities we developed here are agnostic to the extremist
group and social network.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We provide proofs by contradiction that follows the same logic as the block policy proof in [21].
Suppose policy u is optimal and does not satisfy condition (1) in Theorem 1. Then, there exists
i∈ V and integers τ ≥ 0, δ > 1, and ∆> 0 such that
uτ = i
uτ+` 6= i ∀ `∈ {1,2, . . . , δ− 1}
uτ+δ = i
uτ+δ+∆ = i.
Note that this final condition simply implies that the query of i in stage τ +δ is not the final query
of this former friend. From equation (6), the query failure probabilities in stages τ and τ + δ are
qu(τ) =
(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 1)NM
Ni−ϕixi(τ)NM
)
qu(τ + δ) =
(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 2)NM
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 1)NM
)
.
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We construct two alternative policies. The first alternative policy, uˆ, moves the query of i from
stage τ + δ to stage τ + 1. The second alternative policy moves the query of i from stage τ to stage
τ + δ−1. Each of these alternative policies rearranges the sequence of queries in u so that the two
queries of former friend i in stages τ and τ + δ are instead executed in succession. Formally,
uˆt =
{
ut−1 t= τ + 1, . . . , τ + δ
ut otherwise
u˜t =
{
ut+1 t= τ, . . . , τ + δ− 1
ut otherwise.
The relationship between the query failure probabilities follows from these policy definitions:
quˆ(t) =

qu(τ + δ) t= τ + 1
qu(t− 1) t= τ + 2, . . . , τ + δ
qu(t) otherwise.
qu˜(t) =

qu(τ) t= τ + δ− 1
qu(t+ 1) t= τ, . . . , τ + δ− 2
qu(t) otherwise.
We now compare the costs of these policies. Optimality of u implies that the expected cost of
policy uˆ must be at least as high as the cost of u:
E[Cuˆ]≥E[Cu]
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
quˆ(k)≥
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(k)
τ+δ∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
quˆ(k)≥
τ+δ∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
quˆ(τ + 1) + quˆ(τ + 1)
τ+δ∑
t=τ+2
t∏
k=τ+2
quˆ(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k) + qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
qu(τ + δ)− qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)− qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+2
qu(k)
qu(τ + δ)
1− qu(τ + δ) ≥
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k)
Likewise, optimality of u implies that the expected cost of policy u˜ must also be at least as high
as the cost of u
E[Cu˜]≥E[Cu]
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu˜(k)≥
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(k)
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τ+δ−1∑
t=τ
t∏
k=τ
qu˜(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ
t∏
k=τ
qu(k)
τ+δ−2∑
t=τ
t∏
k=τ
qu˜(k) + qu˜(τ + δ− 1)
τ+δ−2∏
k=τ
qu˜(k)≥ qu(τ) + qu(τ)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)− qu(τ)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+2
qu(k)≥ qu(τ)− qu(τ)
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k) ≥ qu(τ)1− qu(τ)
Combining these two conditions, we have
qu(τ)
1− qu(τ) ≤
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k) ≤ qu(τ + δ)1− qu(τ + δ)(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 1)NM
ϕiNM
)
≤
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k) ≤
(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 2)NM
ϕiNM
)
However, under the minimal assumptions that ϕi, Ni and NM are positive, the inequality(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 1)NM
ϕiNM
)
>
(
Ni−ϕi(xi(τ) + 2)NM
ϕiNM
)
is strict, which provides a contradiction.
Now suppose optimal policy u satisfies condition (1) but does not satisfy condition (2), i.e., there
exists a former friend i∈ V for which
Ni
NMϕi
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
>
Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM +NM
)
that is not queried in a single block. Let τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2 be the first stage in policy u in which former
friend i is queried. Because the policy satisfies condition (1), it follows that
ut = i t= τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ 2, τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ 1, . . . , τ.
Also, let τ + δ be the stage corresponding to the final query of former friend i. By assumption this
final query is not executed in succession with the first
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1 queries of i, so δ > 1.
As in the previous part of the proof, we define two alternative policies, each moving two final
queries of i into a single block.
uˆt =
{
ut−1 t= τ + 1, . . . , τ + δ
ut otherwise
u˜t =

u
t+
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1 t= τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ 2, . . . , τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ δ
i t= τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ δ+ 1, . . . , τ + δ
ut otherwise.
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The relationship between the query failure probabilities follows from these policy definitions:
quˆ(t) =

qu(τ + δ) t= τ + 1
qu(t− 1) t= τ + 2, . . . , τ + δ
qu(t) otherwise.
qu˜(t) =

qu(t+
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1) t= τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ 2, . . . , τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ δ
qu(t− δ+ 1) t= τ −
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ δ+ 1, . . . , τ + δ− 1
qu(t) otherwise.
Note also that, from equation (6),
τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2+t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k) =
Ni−ϕi(t+ 1)NM
Ni
, t= 0,1, . . . ,
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 2
τ∏
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(t) =
Ni−ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
NM
Ni
τ∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k) =
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
− ϕiNM
2Ni
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉)(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
qu(τ + δ) =
(1−ϕi)Ni
Ni−ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
NM
.
As in the previous part of the proof, we compare the costs of the policies.
E[Cuˆ]≥E[Cu]
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
quˆ(k)≥
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(k)
τ+δ∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
quˆ(k)≥
τ+δ∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
quˆ(τ + 1) + quˆ(τ + 1)
τ+δ∑
t=τ+2
t∏
k=τ+2
quˆ(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k) + qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
qu(τ + δ)− qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)− qu(τ + δ)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+2
qu(k)
qu(τ + δ)
1− qu(τ + δ) ≥
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k)
Likewise, optimality of u implies that the expected cost of policy u˜ must also be at least as high
as the cost of u:
E[Cu˜]≥E[Cu]
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N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu˜(k)≥
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu˜(k)≥
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+δ∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu˜(k) +
τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+δ∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu˜(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+δ+1
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+δ+1
qu˜(k)
≥
τ∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k) +
τ∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k) +
τ+δ−1∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
τ∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
≥
τ∑
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
t∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k) +
τ∏
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
τ+δ−1∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k) ≥
∑τ
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
∏t
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
1−∏τ
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
.
Combining these two conditions, we have∑τ
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
∏t
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
1−∏τ
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k).
≤
∑τ+δ−1
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏τ+δ−1k=τ+1 qu(k) ≤ qu(τ + δ)1− qu(τ + δ) .
This inequality implies that∑τ
t=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
∏t
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k)
1−∏τ
k=τ−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+2
qu(k).
≤ qu(τ + δ)
1− qu(τ + δ)
Ni
ϕiNM
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
≤ (1−ϕi)Ni
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM +NM
)
,
which is a contradiction.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
First observe that a policy satisfying the condition in Theorem 2 always exists. Such a policy can be
constructed algorithmically by picking the former friend i : i= arg minj∈V γ(x(t), j) and querying i
successively until a stage t′ is reached for which γ(x(t′), i) 6= γ(x(t), i). At this stage a new former
friend is chosen for querying according to the same criterion.
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An important characteristic of γ(x(t), j) is that it is nondecreasing in t for all j ∈ V. This property
implies that for any policy u that satisfies the condition in Theorem 2, γ(x(t), ut)≤ γ(x(t+1), ut+1).
We now show by contradiction that a policy which does not meet the condition of Theorem 2
cannot be optimal. We consider only policies that meet the condition of Theorem 1, as we have
shown this condition to be necessary for optimality. Suppose optimal policy u meets the necessary
condition for optimality in Theorem 1 but does not meet the condition of Theorem 2. Then,
there must be at least one stage τ in which γ(x(τ), uτ )> γ(x(τ + 1), uτ+1). Because γ(x(t), j) is
nondecreasing in t for all j, this condition implies uτ 6= uτ+1. For clarity of notation, assume that
uτ = i and uτ+1 = j.
We construct an alternate policy in which the order of these former friends i and j is reversed.
Let ` be the earliest stage for which γ(x(`), i) = γ(x(τ), i) and
ut = i ∀t∈ {`, `+ 1, . . . , τ}.
Also let L be the latest stage for which γ(x(L), j) = γ(x(τ + 1), j) and
ut = j ∀t∈ {τ + 1, τ + 2, . . . ,L}.
Let δ = τ − ` + 1 be the number of successive stages that i is queried in this sequence and let
∆ =L− τ be the number of successive stages that j is queried in this sequence. In our alternative
policy u˜, we let
u˜t =

ut t= 0, . . . , `− 1,L+ 1, . . . ,N − 1
j t∈ `, `+ 1, . . . , `+ ∆− 1
i t∈ `+ ∆, `+ ∆ + 2, . . . ,L.
This relationship implies
qu˜(t) =

qu(t) t= 0, . . . , `− 1,L+ 1, . . . ,N − 1
qu(t+ δ) t∈ `, `+ 1, . . . , `+ ∆− 1
qu(t−∆) t∈ `+ ∆, `+ ∆ + 2, . . . ,L.
From the optimality of u, we have
E[Cu˜]≥E[Cu]
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu˜(k)≥
N−1∑
t=0
t∏
k=0
qu(k)
L∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu˜(k)≥
L∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu(k)
`+∆−1∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu˜(k) +
(
`+∆−1∏
k=`
qu˜(k)
)
L∑
t=`+∆
t∏
k=`+∆
qu˜(k)≥
τ∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu(k) +
(
τ∏
k=`
qu(k)
)
L∑
τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
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L∑
t=τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k) +
(
L∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)
)
τ∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu(k)≥
τ∑
t=`
t∏
k=`
qu(k) +
(
τ∏
k=`
qu(k)
)
L∑
τ+1
t∏
k=τ+1
qu(k)∑L
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏Lk=τ+1 qu(k) ≥
∑τ
t=`
∏t
k=` qu(k)
1−∏τk=` qu(k) . (10)
We have multiple cases to consider when comparing these policy costs. Consider the sequence of
queries of former friend i, starting in stage ` and ending in stage τ . Our assumptions on policy u
(that it satisfies Theorem 1) and our method of selecting stage ` allow for three distinct possibilities:
Case 1. Stage ` is the first query of i in policy u and stage τ is the
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
th query of i.
By adhering to the necessary conditions for optimality in Theorem 1, this case implies that
Ni
ϕiNM
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
≤ (1−ϕi)Ni
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
)
.
Observe that in this case the quantity
∑τ
t=`
∏t
k=` qu(k)
1−∏τk=` qu(k) =
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
− ϕiNM
2Ni
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1
)
NM
Ni
=
Ni
ϕiNM
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
= γ(x(τ), i)
Case 2. Stage ` < τ is the first query of i in policy u and stage τ is the final (or
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
th) query
of i. Equality of γ(x(t), i) across these stages implies Ni
ϕiNM
− 1
2
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
≥ (1−ϕi)Ni
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
)
.
Observe that in this case the quantity
∑τ
t=`
∏t
k=` qu(k)
1−∏τk=` qu(k) =
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)
− ϕiNM
2Ni
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
− 1
)⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+ (1−ϕi)
ϕi
=
1
ϕj
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
− NM
2Nj
⌈
Nj
NM
⌉(⌈
Nj
NM
⌉
− 1
)
− 1
= γ(x(τ), i)
Case 3. Stage ` = τ is the final query of i in policy u. If this is the case, then γ(x(τ), i) =
Ni(1−ϕi)
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
NM+NM
) , irrespective of whether this query is the only query of i. Observe that in
this final case,
∑τ
t=`
∏t
k=` qu(k)
1−∏τk=` qu(k) =
(
(1−ϕi)Ni
Ni−ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1
)
NM
)
(
Ni−ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1
)
NM−(1−ϕi)Ni
Ni−ϕi
(⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
−1
)
NM
)
=
(1−ϕi)Ni
ϕi
(
Ni−
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
+NM
)
= γ(x(τ), i).
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Note that if stage τ corresponds to the only query of i in policy u, then
⌈
Ni
NM
⌉
= 1 and this
expression reduces to 1−ϕi
ϕi
, which is correct.
These three cases similarly apply to the sequence of queries of former friend j in stages τ +
1, . . . ,L. Therefore, in all cases equation (10) reduces to∑L
t=τ+1
∏t
k=τ+1 qu(k)
1−∏Lk=τ+1 qu(k) ≥
∑τ
t=`
∏t
k=` qu(k)
1−∏τk=` qu(k)
γ(x(τ + 1), j)≥ γ(x(τ), i),
which is a contradiction and shows that Theorem 2 provides a necessary condition for optimality.
To show that this condition is sufficient for optimality, suppose now that policy u satisfies the
conditions in Theorems 1 and 2, but that it is not optimal. This assumption implies that there
is another policy, u? with a lower cost. From our previous arguments, u? must also satisfy the
conditions in Theorems 1 and 2. Because γ(x(t), i) is nondecreasing in t for all i∈ V, the possible
differences between the policies u and u? are in stages where ties exist, i.e.,
∃ i, j ∈ V : i 6= j, γ(x(t), i) = γ(x(t), j).
However, it follows from our development above that these reorderings do not result in a change in
cost. In other words, all policies that meet the conditions in Theorems 1 and 2 result in the same
cost and therefore must be optimal.
C. Classification Threshold Sensitivity
We provide a brief discussion of the sensitivity of the results to changes in the classification thresh-
old. In the previous section, we selected threshold P = 0.782 based on the shape of the ROC
curve and our desire to keep the number of false positive classifications low. We now consider how
different values of threshold P affect the “paired accounts” graph depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 9 gives several properties of the “paired account” graph as a function of P . As we would
expect, when our classification threshold P = 0 the graph is fully connected, which indicates that
all accounts are classified as belonging to the same user. As P increases, the number of connected
accounts and the size of the giant component decrease rapidly. Of interest is the estimated average
clustering coefficient, measured on the right-hand scale in Figure 9. If we had access to the true
classifications so that we could produce a graph of connected accounts that belonged to the same
users, each component would be fully connected. Average clustering provides a measure of how
much a graph exhibits this property by estimating how often a triad of connected nodes is fully
connected.
We see from Figure 9 that the average clustering coefficient is relatively stable for a wide range
of threshold values, but as P increases beyond approximately 0.85 we observe an increase in the
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Figure 9 Paired accounts graph properties as a function of threshold P . The threshold value 0.782 from equation
(3) is indicated on the plot.
average clustering coefficient that suggests that there are clusters of profiles in our data that are
all very similar. Component A, indicated in Figure 5 and enumerated in Table 7, is an example of
such a cluster. There are other fully connected clusters in Figure 5 consisting of more nodes. These
clusters represent users who open many Twitter accounts and retain very similar profile features.
Further investigation of these accounts reveals that they are nearly all suspended, suggesting that
account suspensions are the driving force behind the creation of these multiple accounts. As noted
earlier, in at least some cases these accounts are created by high-profile jihadists.
Decreasing P from 0.782 appears to rapidly increase the number of false positive classifications.
This result becomes quickly apparent in the appearance of a large but loosely connected component
in the paired graph structure. For example, reducing the classification threshold to P = 0.668
(indicated on the ROC plot in Figure 4) increases the profile pairs classified as belonging to the same
user to 455. In many cases, these additional pairs appear to be correct classifications. For example,
component B in Figure 5 appears as a fully connected component using this threshold. However,
we also observe the formation of the loosely connected component indicated as “component C” in
Figure 10. Table 13 shows the profile features for the accounts comprising this component, which
appear to belong to several different users.
D. Features for Refollowing Model
The complete list of features used in the refollow model from Section 5 is listed below.
• Friend’s number of Twitter friends (Log).
• Friend’s number of Twitter followers (Log).
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Figure 10 Graph representation of accounts belonging to the same user using our regression model and equation
(3) with a threshold of 0.668.
Table 13 Accounts comprising component C.
Screen Name Name Profile Pic
AAbuAAwlaki Abu Awlaki [None]
abu alia2 abu alia [None]
Abdullah4510394 Abdullah [None]
abu abdillah12 Abu Abdullah [None]
dewdropz69 Abdullah [None]
Ummabdullaa Umm Abdullah [None]
abouabdullah7 abou abdullah ff. . . e0
AbuAbdullah1400 Abu Abdullah ff. . . ff
abouosama6 Abouosama [None]
Abuusamah17 Abu usamah [None]
AbuIabulfida Abu Abdullah e1. . . 00
AbuAyman2011 Abu Ayman [None]
AbuMuhammad1503 Abu Muhammad [None]
abu malhama4 Abu Malhama [None]
moabibkhab abu hamad [None]
nahida muhammad Nahida muhammad [None]
abumusab musab Abu musab [None]
xcon cp dc Abu Musa [None]
AbuSaalihah06 Abu Saalihah [None]
AbuSaalihah07 Abu Saalihah 00. . . 00
AbuSaalihah08 Abu Saalihah 00. . . 00
AbuSaalihah13 Abu Saalihah 00. . . 00
Abu swaaliha abu swaaliha 1e. . . c3
Abu Malhama5 Abu Malhama bf. . . 00
omertalhaa Abu Talha [None]
islamobjective Abu Ramadi [None]
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• Friend’s number of Tweets (Log).
• Account age difference between Friend and User0.
• Binary indicator of whether Friend was following User0.
• Number of times User0 mentioned Friend in a tweet (Log).
• Number of times User0 retweeted one of Friend’s tweets (Log).
• Number of times User0 replied to one of Friend’s tweets (Log).
• User0’s number of Twitter friends (Log).
• User0’s number of Twitter followers (Log).
• User0’s number of Tweets (Log).
• User0’s number of favorite tweets (Log).
• User0’s total number of retweets (Log).
• Average number of friends of User0’s friends (Log).
• Median number of friends of User0’s friends (Log).
• Standard deviation of the number of friends of User0’s friends (Log).
• Average number of followers of User0’s friends (Log).
• Median number of followers of User0’s friends (Log).
• Standard deviation of the number of followers of User0’s friends (Log).
• Average number of tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Median number of tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Standard deviation of the number of tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Average number of favorite tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Median number of favorite tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Standard deviation of the number of favorite tweets of User0’s friends (Log).
• Binary indicator of whether Friend’s account authenticity had been verified by Twitter.
• Fraction of User0’s friends that had account authenticity verified by Twitter.
• Binary indicator of whether Friend and User0 had the same account language setting.
